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Does "Food for Peace" Assistance
Damage the Bolivian Economy?
By MELVIN BURKE*

Do commodity surplus shipments in fact "encourage economic development in the developing countries ... that are
determined to improve their own agricultural production ... "?l
Or conversely, is it true that "food aid is damaging to the countries which receive it, and they should be helped to increase
the productivity of their own farmers"? 2 The former Bolivian
Minister of Petroleum, Marcelo Quiroga, who was largely responsible for the nationalization of the Gulf Oil subsidiary in
his country, apparently believes "Food for Peace" aid is damaging to the Bolivian economy. In a recent interview with
Selden Rodman, he had this to say on the subject:
Your government must re alize that other countries want
to decide on their own m anner of growth. Let me give
you an example. Every year Bolivia lays out $30 million
for U.S. food-half of this for wheat and flour , though
we could grow our own and have the milling facilities. In
order to keep the price of wheat high, you subsidize your
wheat farmers. This expensive product is then shipped
to Bolivia already milled. So there is no work for our
millers , and our peasants don't grow wheat ... Why? 3

This paper will attempt to answer Sefior Quiroga's indictment

* Associate

professor of economics, University of Maine.
U.S. Congress , Food for Peace Act of 1966, Public Law 808, 89
Cong., 2nd Sess., 1966, Sec. 2A an amendment to the Agricultural Trade
Development and Assistance Act of 1954, Public Law 480, 83 Cong.,
2nd Sess. , 1954.
2 "Don't Feed the Starving Millions," The Economist, CCXXVIII
(Sept.-Oct., 1968), 60-61.
3 Selden Rodman, "Bolivia: Friend or Foe?", National Review, XXII,
No. 45 (Nov. 17, 1970), 1211 and 1227.
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of the U.S. "Food for Peace" foreign aid since it is under this
program that Bolivia spends most of the $15 million for flour
imports referred to in his statement above.
To begin with, my major disagreement with ex-minister
Quiroga and other Bolivian nationalists on this subject is that
they do not acknowledge the historic need of Bolivia for these
flour imports or their many benefits to Bolivia before 1968.
A brief historical sketch of the transition from domestic production to importation of flour in Bolivia over the last two
decades will reveal the basis for my disagreement.
Since 1952 the Bolivian consumption of flour, the major
wheat product, increased at the rate of approximately five percent per year. This exceeds the two percent rate of population
growth and approximates the four percent growth in urbanization.' On the other hand, domestic wheat and flour production never was adequate to meet this demand. Thus, Bolivia
has traditionally been an importer of both wheat and flour.
However, as cart be seen by an examination of the data in
table 1, Bolivia has increasingly substituted flour imports for
domestic production of wheat and flour.
It would be incorrect to attribute this fundamental change
in the Bolivian economy to anyone institution, historic event,
or body politic. Bolivia's traditional dual economy, 1952 social
revolution, post revolutionary governments as well as the PL
480 (Food for Peace) program share responsibility for this
change from domestic production to flour importation.
Between 1930 and 1951 the Bolivian wheat mills produced
sufficient flour to supply the entire nation with the exception
of the large mines which traditionally relied upon imports.
However, due largely to the inability of the latifundio land
tenure system 5 to.. provide the domestic mills with wheat of
acceptable quality in sufficient quantity, increasing portions
4 The demand for wheat flour is a derived demand for bread and is
more responsive to changes in urbanization than to changes in either
total population, national income, or prices.
5 A latifundio land tenure system is one which is dominated by large
landed estates. These enterprises are u~ually abstentee-owned and run
on traditional (customary) rather than pwfit maximizing principles. A
latifundio (large estate) is not a plantation. The latter is typically
highly capitalized and foreign owned.
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TABLE I
Wheat and Flour :
Bolivia 1950-1968
(thousands of metric tons)

1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968

Wheat
Production Imports
34
46
32
31
74
24
72
21
59
17
34
17
13
40
55
45
3
62
14
62
40
5
40
21
50
19
55
5
58
16
42
15
36
27
39
47
45

FLour Production a
Domesti.c Tm.p01ted
10
27
6
33
25
4
3
53
5
38
13
37
2
50
1
32
14
5
13
3
4
3
1
4
3
4
4
5
6
4
4
11
3
14
5
14
12';
16

FLour
Imports
17
33
16
11
19
22
15
63
65
72
78
102
94
103
96
109
108
128
98

Based upon a 75% extraction yield
estimate.
Source: Bolivia, Direccion General de Estadisticas y Censos.
a

* AID

of Bolivian flour were milled from imported wheat. Thus, one
finds in Bolivia's historic dual economy and traditional agricultural sector a beginning of wheat and flour imports substituting for domestic production.
The revolution of 1952 and the agrarian reform of 1953
undoubtedly disrupted traditional producing and marketing
channels giving rise to a decrease in domestic production of
wheat for the market. G Concurrent with these revolutionary
effects, the hyperinflation of 1952-1956 and the existent multiple exchange rate favored imports , making it increasingly
lucrative to substitute wheat-and to a lesser extent flour" In August (1953, less than one year after the revolution, the Movimien to Nacionalista Revolucionario (MNR) Government of Bolivia
passed the Decreto de la Reforma Agraria and proceeded to redistribute
tile lands of the Latifundios to the former Indian peasants. In addition,
theMNR government nationalized the large tin mines, decreed universal suffrage, and instituted other economic and social reforms.

6
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imports for domestic output,7 The MNR revolution, land reform, and inflation were, therefore, events contributing to
increased importation of wheat and flour.
Shortly after the monetary stabilization program was successfully implemented in 1957, flour imports increasingly
replaced wheat imports. One plausible explanation for this
change is that the Bolivian millers found it unprofitable to mill
imported wheat from 1952 to 1957 because of their inability
to dispose of the wheat bran by-products at a high enough
price. At the same time they apparently began to realize that
flour importation, unlike wheat importation, posed no byproduct disposal problem.
There can be little doubt that the U.S. Point IV and Food
for Peace programs encouraged these flour imports by offering surplus flour to the Bolivian government at below world
market prices. Indeed, these surplus commodity shipments
more nearly resembled grants than sales. This is especially
true between 1960 and 1968 when Bolivia purchased large
quantities of U. S. flour with domestic currency under Title I
of PL 480. 8 From that date to the present, PL 480 flour imports have had a greater influence upon the Bolivian wheat
and flour industries than any other single factor. Table 2
below clearly shows the overwhelming dominance of these
flour imports from the United States since 1960.
In sum, PL 480 surplus food assistance to Bolivia which
began in 1961 was not the first or only influence in the transition from domestic production to importation of flour in Bolivia over the last twenty years. Bolivian nationalists, like
Marcelo Quiroga, are, however, correct in pointing out that
once on the scene, these "free" PL 480 surplus commodity
imports not only accelerated the process of importation, but
7 The overvalued official rate applied to wheat and flour imports since
these were considered "basic food necessities." Combined with the lise
in domestic prices, this gave a windfall profit to wheat and flour importers thereby encouraging the substitution of imports for domestic
production.

s Title lof Public Law 480 (The Agricultural Trade Development and
Assistance Act of 1954) authorized the President of the United States
to "negotiate and carry out agreements with friendly nations or organizations of friendly nations to provide for the sale of surplus agricultural
commodities for foreign currencies."
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TABLE II

1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968

.B olivian Flour Imports
(thousands of metric tons)
Argentina
U.S .A.a
5
6
12
21
7
9
2
8
4
15
5
10
3
28
35
41
24
13
57
15
46
63
23
66
16
82
7
3
93
91
7
92
10
119
5
84
13

Othersb
6
1
1
17
2
1
16
15
12
15
10
6
4
1

a No reliable data exist on quantity of flour imported from U .S. per
calendar year under PL 480 agreements. An estimate can be made
using fiscal year shipments as a guide . About 95% of all flour imports
from U.S. over the years 1961-68 were PL 480 imports and roughly 75%
of these flour imports fell under Title r.
b Major other exporters include Canada, Chile and West Germanv.
These figures are residuals.
Source: Bolivia, Direcci6n General de Estadisticas y Censos.

rendered it virtually irreversible. Nevertheless, the benefits to
the Bolivians from this program before 1968 were numerous
and impressive. First of all, Bolivia could not have imported
these large quantities of flour on more favorable terms than
those obtained under Title I, PL 480. Before 1968 Bolivia
paid for these flour imports with local currency generated
from their domestic sales. Because nearly 75 percent of these
counterpart funds were spent in Bolivia on developmental
projects, they, in fact, constituted a grant in kind to the Bolivian government and people. Consequently, Bolivia was able
to import high quality flour in quantities sufficient to satisfy
increasing portions of her domestic demand paid for with
grants from the supplier. The urban population, miners, and
other consumers of flour were, in the process, subsidized. The
campesinos (peasants) benefited from land titling, colonization, community development, and other rural programs fi-

8
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nanced with counterpart funds . The miller-importers were
apparently content with the profits received from importing
flour to let their mills lie idle or underutilized. n The Bolivian
government used significant amounts of the local currency
generated from PL 480 flour sales for, among other things,
general budget support. In short, these enormous flour grants
apparently averted a food crisis without draining Bolivia's
scarce foreign exchange while simultaneously creating large
stocks of local currency to be utilized for developmental investments, central government budget support, and other uses.
The Bolivians were not the only ones who benefited from
this program, however. PL 480 flour shipments to Bolivia were
also benefiicial to the United States. They not only disposed
of part of the wheat and flour surpluses resulting from the
Commodity Credit Corporation Farm Price Support Program,
but, in addition, generated the local currency to help finance
the U.S. Embassy and AID Mission in Bolivia. What better
way to dispose of surplus commodities than to use them to
pay for one's overseas activities!
Or perhaps one should say, who benefits least from the
"Food for Peace" program since all available evidence indicates that the net effect of this program is now "damaging"
to Bolivia's economy as well as to the U.S. foreign aid program.
While most Bolivians, including Marcelo Quiroga, intuitively
know this to be true, their interpretation of why these flour
imports are detrimental to their nation's developmental efforts
is often misleading or incorrect. Because a nation can grow
and mill its own wheat is no economic justification for doing
so. "Food for Peace' 'flour shipments are not per se "damaging" to the Bolivian economy. Rather, it is the manner in
which the program was handled in the past and the recent
changes in finance which have rendered it so. From the beginning PL 480 flour shipments supplanted rather than supplemented domestic output. Very little of the funds obtained
from the sale of these imports were utilized to increase the
domestic output of wheat and flour.lO Subsequently, by 1968
o See Appendix A, for a brief account of the transformation of
Bolivian millers into importers.
10 Since 1961, AID has provided over $200 million in loans and grants
to Bolivia. Approximately $70 million of this amount was road loans.
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lese commodity imports no longer constituted a grant to
olivia as they did in the past for PL 808 (amendment to PL
80) which stipulated that Bolivia pay for Title I flour shipents with long term dollar credits rather than PesosY
As the situation now stands, Bolivia is paying dollars, on
:tremely favorable credit terms , to import flour for consumpm while rural underemployment and excess capacity exists
the domestic wheat flour mills, transportation, and related
dustries. Bolivia is obligating and spending foreign exchange
purchase flour, a consumption good which is apparently
pable of being efficiently produced domestically, instead of
lrchasing capital goods which she is unable to produce, but
lich are indispensable to economic development. l ~ Conseendy, had this change in finance not occurred, it would be
tremely difficult to state categorically whether the overall
t effect of these flour shipments was detrimental or beneial to the economic development of Bolivia.

tn summary, "Food for Peace" flour shipments to Bolivia
ltributed to the rapid increase in domestic consumption,
l nothing to increase the domestic production of wheat, and
j an adverse effect upon the Bolivian milling industry lead: to a decline in domestic flour production. In this way the
)gram was partially responsible for widening the gap be~en domestic production and consumption of wheat flour
:essitating increased importation. Finally, in 1968 when
ivia was dependent upon flour imports to satisfy almost
entire effective domestic demand, the U.S. government
.nged the program from one of grants to long-term dollar
lculture has always received low priority from both the Bolivian govnent and the AID mission : Even then, rice production was encour1 with loans and grants totaling $1,750,000 since 1962. Sugar and
r agricultural products received comparable assistance. Wheat, on
other hand, received its first loan of $200,000 in 1967 and another
>,000 loan in 1969. As of this date, less than half of the first wheat
of $200,000 has been dispersed .
Section 103(b), Title I of PL 808 reads "take steps to assure a
ressive transition from sales for foreign currencies to sales for dol.. . at a rate whereby the transition can be completed by December
.971."
It could be argued that any increases in resources such as PL 480
imports are capital imports, but they are not physicial capital goods
,rts. Pesos cannot buy needed capital goods produced abroad.

10
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loans. At least with respect to Bolivia's experience with the
PL 480 (and later PL 808) food aid program, it would appear
that the overall net effect was "damaging" to her economy.
Thus, while I may disagree with Senor Quiroga and other
brilliant young Bolivians on a number of significant details,
I agree with them that the present "Food for Peace" program
is detrimental to their economy and that the policy must be
changed.
Bolivia should, therefore, begin to implement a policy of
flour imports substitution as soon as possible and the United
States should cooperate in this endeavor. Recent technological
advances in wheat production have, for the first time in Bolivian history, made such a policy both technically and eco~
nomically feasible. This fact is all too often ignored by Bo~
livian nationalists who advocate a policy of flour import substitution. Perhaps, however, they are simply not aware of the
important role improved seed such as Corpuso or Mexican
Jaral plays in this national decision. In any event, they will
find a great deal of support for their position in what follows.
To begin with, the argument against flour import substitution
will be briefly considered and then dismissed. It has been
argued that Bolivia should import flour since she suffers a comparative disadvantage in growing wheat and milling flour.
Therefore, Bolivia would do well to allocate her scarce resources to the production of other goods in which .she has a
relative advantage. The Bolivian economy was not, is not,
nor will be in the foreseeable future, a fully employed economy. It is virtually impossible to argue comparative advantage when such conditions exist. In addition, all infant industries, such as Bolivian wheat and milling using traditional
methods of production, dated technology, and possibly less
than optimum size plant, are initially at a competitive disadvantage with respect to similar established industries abroad.
This is especially true if wheat and flour are imported at below commercial world market prices as they are under the
"Food for Peace" program. Therefore, the problem cannot be
viewed as one of allocating scarce resources among alternative
productions within a static economic framework to achieve
some ideal efficiency optimum. The real issue is not whether
Bolivia should be self-sufficient in wheat and flour or that these
Bolivian products should compete in the world market, but
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f~Hier

11

whether domestic production can be increased by em-

~!~}'ing existing idle r~sources. to conse~ve foreign exchange

f6:l.'ultimate use in the ImportatIOn of capItal goods not capable
8f<domestic production. In sum, when viewed in a dynamic
growth setting one arrive~ at the co.nclusion that not only can
Bolivia substitute domestIc productIOn of wheat and flour for
imports, but she must.

If Bolivia does not immediately begin a crash program to
illcrease domestic output, she can look forward to continued
stagnation of her wheat and flour industries as well as con
tinued drain on her foreign exchange. The adverse effect of
these on economic development, the central government
budget, the balance of payments, and the external debt are
obvious. In table III below is provided an estimate of the
~~?itional expenditure of foreign exchange over the ten year
period 1969-1978, for wheat and flour imports, assuming a
{olir percent per year increase in consumption and no change
in domestic production.
Thus, even if Bolivia obtained all her wheat and flour imports under PL 808 with favorable terms of 2% percent interest with 20 years to pay, by 1978 she will have spent the
equivalent of $72,643,600 and incurred a foreign exchange
debt of $211,288,600 for these same imports. It is, however,
only fair to add that an equivalent value of local currency
would be generated in the process, nearly all of which would
be invested in Bolivia. But taking into consideration the fact
that these pesos would be purchased with dollars, the benefit
to Bblivia would be substantially lessened.
If, on the other hand, a policy of promoting domestic production of wheat and flour to substitute for imports of the
same were implemented, the gains to the Bolivian economy
could be both immediate and substantial. Initially, top pripritYivvould be assigned to increasing the quality and quantity
of. Bolivian wheat. Widespread introduction of such non-tradit!bIialinputs as improved seed and fertilizer into Bolivian
\V~~~fgr()?l1ction over the same ten-year period could result
insubstantial increase in domestic wheat production. Imprbved.seed, such as Corpuso or Mexican J aral, has been estimafedtbi:ncrease yield between 60 percent and 100 percent
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TABLE III
ESTIMATES OF PRODUCTION AND IMPORTATION OF WHEAT
WITHOUT A SUCCESSFUL WHEAT PROGRAM: BOLIVIA 1969-1978'
--=::::

Consumption
(000 M.T.)
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1969-1978
1969-1997

233.0
242.4
252.1
262.2
272.7
283.6
294.9
306.7
319.0
331.8

Domestic
Production
(000 M.T.)

Imports
(000 M.T.)

45.0
45.0
45.0
45.0
45.0
45.0
45.0
45.0
45.0
45.0

188.0
197.4
207.1
217.2
227.7
238.6
249.9
261.7
274.0
286.8

450.0

2,348.4

Foreign
Exchange
Spent on
Imp07ts c
($000)
1,136.9
2,330.6
3,583.0
4,896.5
6,273.5
7,716.4
9,227.6
10,810.2
12,467.2
14,201.6
72,643.5
284,032.1

a Based upon projections of B. Delworth Gardner, Prospects for a
Successful Wheat Program (unpublished report, 1968), pp. 26 and 28.
b Assuming each metric ton of imported wheat equivalent costs, on
the average, $95.80.
c Assuming all imported wheat equivalents paid for in U. S. dollars
at 2lj2 percent interest over 20 years with no grace period.

(from .6 to .9 or 1.2 metric tons per hectare) .l:{ This wheat is
of the hard variety demanded by Bolivian millers and consumers. Consequently, it commands a higher price, and the
expected returns to the farmer are significanLl1 Thus a "new
seed for old seed" program for Bolivia is the first step. Among
the merits of this program is the fact that it is a low cost program requiring little if any foreign exchange outlay. Also, if
fertilizer is introduced in conjunction with improved seed. the
anticipated increase in output is much greater. It is not un-.
realistic to expect an output of 234,000 metric tons of improved domestic wheat by the year 1978, equal to 70 percent
of Bolivia's projected needs if a national wheat program were
rigiorously and promptly carried out. Table IV reveals estimates of expected increases in domestic output for the years
1:) B. Delworth Gardner, Prospects for a Sllccessflll Program in Bolivia,
( unpublished report , June, 1968), pp. 14-18.
14 B. Delworth Gardner estimates that a Bolivian campesino can expect to realize a net profit per hectare of $47.20 by substituting improved seed for criollo (unimproved domestic) seed. Ibid.
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]!1STIlV1ATES OF PRODUCTION AND IMPORTATION OF WHEAT
WITH A SUCCESSFUL WHEAT PROGRAM: BOLIVIA 1969-1978 a
~

1969
1970
1971
1972
1.973
1974
1975
1976
1977
'1 978
J969-1978
1969-1997

Consumption

Domestic
Production

Importsb

Foreign
Exchange
Spent on
Importsc

(000 M.T.)

(000 M.T.)

(000 M.T.)

($ U.S. 000)

233.0
242.4
252.1
262.2
272.7
283.6
294.9
306.7
319.0
331.8

52.2
64.2
77.7
92.9
110.3
129.7
151.4
176.0
203.3
234.0

180.8
178.2
174.4
169.3
162.4
153.9
143.5
130.7
115.7
97.8

1,093.3
2,170.9
3,125.6
4,249.4
5,231.4
6,162.1
7,030.0
7,820.3
8,520.0
9,111.4

1,291.0

1,506.7

54,614.4
182,228.9

a Based upon projections of B. Delworth Gardner, Prospects for a Successful Wheat Progmm (unpublished report, 1968), pp . 26 and 28.
b Assuming each metric ton of imported wheat equivalent costs, on
the average, $95.80.
c Assuming all imported wheat equivalents paid for in U. S. dollars
at 21/2 percent interest over 20 years with no grace period.

1969-1978 assuming an eight percent increase in acreage
planted with Corpuso seed each year, half of which is fertilized.
The projections in table IV are based on the assumption that
the increased domestic wheat production would be milled into
,flour. In light of what has been said about the Bolivian milling
industry, it is unrealistic to expect increases in domestic wheat
output to be automatically milled into flour. However, there
are no problems related to the milling processes which are insurmountable. As domestic wheat production is augmented
over the years, the Bolivian government would have to restrict
wheat and flour imports to that portion of national needs not
satisfied by domestic supply. The government would also be
required to time such imports so as not to conflict with the
harvest and milling of domestic wheat. Above all, the government should adopt new tax, import, and pricing policies which
could enable the miller-importers to obtain a greater profit
in milling wheat than in importing flour. Another appropriate

14

INTER-AMERICAN ECONOMIC AFFAIRS

policy change would be to eliminate or reduce the five percent
above cost profit guarantee presently granted to importers of
flour.
Fortunately, the abundant excess capacity in the Bolivian
milling industry could immediately be put into productive use.
As the mills expand the production of flour using improved
domestic wheat, they would realize some economies inasmuch
as wages, electrical, water , and other overhead costs decrease
per unit of output with greater utilization of existing excess
capacity. In adidtion, studies have shown that it is those
mills located in the producing areas milling domestic wheat
that presently make the greatest profits. 1 r. All of this augurs
well for the future profitability of the Bolivian milling industry.
However, new investments would be required for retooling,
modernization, and expansion. 1 6 In addition, since all reports
on the Bolivian milling industry single out by-product disposal
as the number one problem of the industry today, there is every
reason to expect this situation to become critical once production begins its rapid increase. " However, this area n eeds further investigation in depth, and until the mills do operate at
near capacity using relatively inexpensive domestic wheat any
prediction as to the future profitability of Bolivian milling is
pure conjecture. Even if by-product disposal was a problem for
the future, the cost of subsidizing by-product sales would probably be more than offset by the benefits, not only to the wheat
and flour industries, but also the poultry, livestock, and other
industrial users of wheat bran.
Indeed, the potential benefit to Bolivia of such a successful
wheat and flour program appear to be so great as to overwhelm any costs incurred. In spite of the fact that Bolivia
would probably still not be self-sufficient in flour after 1978,
1" Jan Boomkamp, Diagnostico Sobre La Economia Triguera de Bolivia
( unpublished report, April, 1966 ), passim.
11; The Bolivian Millers Associa tion claims th a t the industr y is presently expanding its capacity to approximately 215 ,000 m etric tons of
wheat per year.
17 The Boomkamp report points out tha t no profits can be made in
the Bolivian mills unless these by-products are disposed of at some remuner a tive price since they con stitute about eight percent of the mills'
total revenue.

15
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a comparison of tables 3 and 4 show that a sa::gs of ovher
$10'0,000,000 of foreign exchange could be re
ed by t e
successful · accomplishment of such a program.
TABLE V
EsTIMATES OF PRODUCTION AND IMPORTS OF WHEAT
WITH AND WITHOUT A SUCCESSFUL WHEAT
PROGRAM: BOLIVIA 1969-1978
(a comparison of Tables 3 and 4 above)

(000 M.T. )
Imports
Total
of Wheat
Domestic
Equivalents
Wheat
Production (000 M .T.)

Foreign
Exchange
Spent on
Imports
($ U.S .)

Exchange Debts
Total Foreign
Accumulated
as a Result
of Importation
($ U.s.)

Without a Succc~ssf~l Wheat
;Program
450,000

2,348,000

72,643,500

284,032,100

hWith a Successful Wheat
Program
1,291,000

1,506,700

54,614,400

182,228,900

-841,700

-18,029,100

-101,803,200

Difference
Due to
Program

+841 ,000

In addition, these increases in domestic flour production would
J:l~ve

ramifications throughout the entire Bolivian economy.
The large increases in national income and employment generated each year by the wheat farms, flour mills, transportation
industries, by-products industries, and others would be incr,~ased many times over as the income flows multiplied
through the economy.
\Vhile it is extremely difficult to estimate the costs of this
national wheat and flour program, an approximation of money
costs for the wheat program only would be about $2 million
for new seed, $9 million for fertilizer, and some undetermined
amount for agricultural extension services. To this must be
~?ded the money costs of mill investment and subsidy bypr'oduct disposal. However, most of these are local currency
costs whereas a large portion of the benefits is in dollar savings. Many of the local currency costs could be paid for with
the $20 million of counterpart funds presently available from
past sales of "Food for Peace" flour imports.

16
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Perhaps all these calculations are misleading since the real
costs of the program are opportunity costs such as foregone
income, employment, and foreign exchange savings from do- ·
mestic production of wheat and flour. That is to say, the real
costs of a Bolivian wheat and flour program as outlined in this
paper are continued stagnation of the rural sector, perpetuation of the dual economy, and future monetary difficulties. 1s
Inasmuch as the United States is concerned with these problems, they also become opportunity costs to the U. S. Mission
in Bolivia and the U. S. government and people at home.
These costs would exceed any conceivable benefit to either the
United States or Bolivia if continuation of the present program
of importing flour under PL 808 at the expense of domestic
production is continued.
In sum, there are no major technical or economic obstacles
to instituting a new policy of flour import substitution, and
the potential benefits many. The problem, as ex-minister
Quiroga points out is a political one. When asked by Mr.
Rodman, "Why don't you grow your own wheat and grind it?",
he replied:
Because our government makes a profit on the sale of
your wheat. . .. I tried to reverse this policy when I was
in the cabinet but the commercial interests were too
strong. ' !!
Conclusion

Bolivia's experience with aid in the form of commodity surplus shipments should provide some guidelines for the continued or future use of this unique type of foreign aid. While
"Food for Peace" assistance is not inherently detrimental to
the agricultural economies of the lesser developed countries,
they can easily become so as the Bolivian experience has
shown. When this occurs, explanations are necessary and a
change of policy is imperative. Whether or not this type of
foreign aid program should be continued is less important
than the manner in which it is carried out. The timing, size,
and finance of commodity surplus shipments as well as the
expenditure of the counterpart funds will ultim a tely determine
l ~ These could include budget , balance of payments and/or foreign
debt servicing difficulties.
19 Seldom Rodman, p. 1227.
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its failure or success. Unless greater care is taken in the future
with "Food for Peace," this ostensibily low cost assistance may
become the most costly program this country has yet undertaken.
APPENDIX A: THE BOLIVIAN MILLER-IMPORTERS
In 1963 the Bolivian government fixed the wholesale price
of all flour at $6.58 per hundredweight in La Paz, Oruro, and
Potosi, and slightly higher prices in the other cities depending
upon transportation costs. Not only was the price of flour
fixed, but the government also guaranteed importers of PL
480 flour a five percent above cost net revenue return . Consequently, the Bolivian miller-importers elected to import flour
rather than mill domestic or imported wheat. To begin with,
the poor quality and erratic supply of domestic wheat accounted for the millers' reluctance to mill more than a small
fraction of the nation's output. The apparent inability of the
millers to dispose of their bran by-product explains why they
were not eager to mill large quantities of imported wheat.
Most important, however, is the fact that the uncertainties of
flour production included the possibility of encountering economic losses whereas importation of flour was a guaranteed
profitable undertaking. For example, a well documented study
of the Bolivian milling industry for the years 1963-1965 by
Jan Boomkamp, shows that the Simsa Mill (Oruro) obtained
net revenues of $6.16 per metric ton of flour produced while
Molinera Boliviana (La Paz) earned $3.22 per metric ton.
The owners of both these mills were also importers who over
the same time period earned net revenues of $6.63 metric ton
of imported flour. 20 Bedoya and Grace, accounting for approximately 65 percent of the nation's total milling capacity,
changed their primary function from flour production to flour
importation. In table 6 below, both are shown to be underutilizing their flour mills and importing greater quantities of
flour than they produce.
The Bolivian millers also extracted 75 percent flour from a
given quantity of wheat instead of the usual 72 percent in
order to obtain a greater portion of high value flour as well
as to minimize the output of low value by-product which is, as
stated above, difficult to sell. In so doing, however, they low20 Jan Boomkamp , Tables 11 and 21.
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TABLE VI
MILLER-IMPORTERS, BEDOYA AND GRACE

Mill Capacity (M.T. flour per year)a
Mill Capacity as Percent of National Total
Flour Production (M.T. average 1961-1967)
Flour Production as Percent of Capacity
(average 1961-1967)
Wheat Imports (M.T.)
Flour Imports (M.T. )

Grace

Bedoya

17,280
21
2,967

37,800
45
7,719

17
3,793 b
38,842b

20
10,472c
10,075c

a Assuming a 75 percent extraction rate of flour from wheat.
b Average for 1961-1967. The 38,842 M.T. average includes imports
by Grace for other companies.
c Average for years 1965-1967 only.

ered the quality of domestic flour making it even more noncompetitive with imported flour. In an attempt to prevent the
complete collapse of the Bolivian milling industry, the government decreed that one out of every four parts of flour sold in
Bolivia must be of national origin. In light of what has been
said above, it is not surprising that as a result of these actions,
the Bolivian milling industry only utilized between 25 percent
25 percent and 30 percent of total capacity in 1968 as seen
below. The reader will note that once again Senor Quiroga is
only partially correct when he says that Bolivia has sufficient
milling facilities. From table 6 above, one can see that were
Bolivia to cease importing flour tomorrow, she would not have
adequate plant and equipment to mill over 100,000 additional
metric tons of flour.
TABLE VII
WHEAT MILLED AS A PERCENTAGE OF CAPACITY
ESTIMATES: BOLIVIA 1950-1968

Minister of
Agriculture Estimate a
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960

56
60
44
84
66
76
78
51
29
24
11

Bolivian Millers'
Association Estimate a
45
48
35
67
53
61
63
41
23
19
09
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1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968

08
11

15
16
24
26
28
32

19
06
08
12
12
19
21
23
26

=

a Absolute estimated capacities: Ministry of Agriculture
88,000
metric tons and Bolivian Millers' Association = 110,000 metric tons .
Source: Direcci6n General de Estadisticas y Censos.

